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I. INTRODUCTION 1 . '
A. Background and Issues to be Addressed
In October 1985, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) established 
a system of foreign exchange auctioning. This replaced quarterly rationing by 
an inter-ministerial committee which by many accounts had become inefficient 
and corrupt (Sanderson, 1987). The auction, and the host of accompanying 
reforms, had enormous short-run consequences for Zambian political and 
economic stability and had long-run potential .for pro-found structural 
transformation until its cancellation by President Kaunda in May 1987.
Because the auction was terminated only recently and the new Foreign 
Exchange Management Committee (FEMAC) which rations foreign exchange has only 
been operating for one year, little has been written comparing economic 
performance and the business climate'under the alternative systems.
This paper examines the effects of these different foreign exchange 
allocation systems on agriculture. We will first address three questions at 
the.level of the general economy:
1. What types of companies classified by ownership pattern ^private 
Zambian, transnational corporations (TNC's), parastatals and mixed 
parastatal/private) have been relatively-more successful in acquiring 
foreign exchange?
2. Which sectors have been more Successful, in obtaining foreign exchange 
under the two systems?
3. Has the composition of commodities imported differed between the 
auction and FEMAC?
. We will then examine in greater detail the effects of alternative foreign' 
exchange allocation systems on agriculture by addressing the following 
questions:
4. What types of companies within the agricultural sector classified by 
ownership pattern have been relatively more successful in acquiring 
foreign exchange?
5. Has the composition of commodities imported by agricultural. 
enterprises differed between the auction and FEMAC?
6. What types of agricultural companies classified by economic activity 
(commercial farms, food processors, input manufacturers and
1 This research is a component of an on-going food security research 
program conducted by the University of Zimbabwe and Michigan State University 
under a Food Security in Africa Cooperative Agreement funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development, with contributions from the 
Regional Office for Southern Africa, the Africa Bureau, and the Science and 
Technqlogy Bureau.
distributors) have been relatively more successful in obtaining foreign 
exchange under the two systems?
7. During the auction, what was the trading environment like for,private
and public companies? How is it different now? \
8. To what extent is the Zambian experience generalizable to other 
Southern African countries? What variables are key to understanding the 
potential impacts of introducing an auction bn other Southern African . 
economies which currently ration foreign exchange?
1 B. The Context of, Foreign Exchange Auctioning
Movement to some form of a flexible exchange rate system is often a major 
element of IMF reform programmes carried out with member country governments 
which have previously maintained overvalued exchange rates. In- recent years, 
a number of Sub-Saharan African countries have adopted IMF-sponsored reform 
packages which have included as one component movement from centrally- 
administered foreign exchange rationing at fixed or tied exchange rates to 
auctioning of foreign exchange'at floating exchange rates (Table 1). -
. Foreign exchange auctioning is basically carried out in two ways. One way 
is through use of an interbank market (such as in The Gambia,. Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, and Zaire) where the exchange rate is negotiated between commercial 
banks. The central bank's role is limited to smoothing operations-such as 
regulating monopolistic behavior arid setting floor arid'ceiling'bidding, 
limits. The second way is an auction system (such as.in Ghana, Guinea, 
Uganda, and Zambia) where the central bank plays a more direct role. Export 
receipts are surrendered to the central bank which auctions foreign exchange 
on, a daily or weekly basis- The central bank decides how much foreign 
exchange will be offered on auction (after some amount has been set aside ..for 
meeting foreign debt obligations and other essential hard currency 
transactions). The exchange rate for a given auction period is determined in 
one of two ways: a."marginal system" whereby all bidders pay the lowest rate 
which exhausts that period's supply of foreign exchange; or a "Dutch auction 
system" where bidders exchange local currency fpr dollars at the actual rate 
that they have bid.
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The policy choice of moving from a fixed or heavily managed exchange rate 
regime to a floating regime (which an auction implies) is controversial.
Among the reasons commonly cited by proponents of a floating' system are:.
- Domestic resource allocation will become more efficient and
. international competitiveness of the country will.improve as producers 
and consumers respond to market signals resulting from a more realistic . 
exchange rate. This will: create a healthier export climate, especially 
for the agricultural sector which has historically been heavily taxed by 
many African governments; provide greater incentives for import 
substitution; and improve.the country's balance of payments position;
- By moving from ah^arbitrary.and slow-moving bureaucratic system to a 
market-determined one, commodities which are most critical for the
l
domestic economy (spare parts arid capital goods) will receive a share of 
foreign exchange commensurate with the value that society attaches to 
them. The bureaucracy can not hope to match the performance of the 
market in determining these values and allocating foreign exchange 
accordingly;
- A float reduces incentives for parallel market activity. This brings 
such activities' back into the mainstream economy, broadening access to 
foreign exchange receipts to the entire economy, arid adding to the tax 
base; '
- By moving to a float (as opposed to an officially-decreed single _
devaluation), the government may avoid some of the negative political 
consequences that irivariably accompany the decision to devalue.
Arguments typically made against floating exchange rate regimes are:
- They are inequitable. The urban arid rural poor suffer greatly from 
the severe inflation that accompanies exchange rate adjustment while 
well-heeled speculators and foreigners such as TNC's and international 
banks capture most of the beriefits;
- Shocks are so acute in the short-run that reform efforts become 
politically unsustainable;
- Severe exchange rate instability greatly reduces the ability of public 
and private enterprises to plan future activities;
- Without the government regulating what is imported, the local economy . 
is flooded with luxury items which are a waste of scarce foreign 
exchange.
Eight of the nine SADCC countries are currently members of the IMF arid five 
governments (Zambia,'Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania) have signed 
economic reform agreements so far in the 1980's 2. At present, six SADCC 
governments ration foreign exchange 3. Establishment of an auctfon or 
interbank system is a possible component of future reform packages for these 
countries. An improved knowledge of the Zambian experience is potentially 
valuable to any government that must choose among a number of foreign exchange 
management alternatives. ' . >
. 3 . , _■
2 Angola is not a member at present although the government has recently
begun negotiations to enter the IMF. "•
3 Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola ration
foreign exchange while the three South African Customs Union (SACU) members -- 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland —  have no barriers for internal customs 
union trade and adhere to the South African tariff structure for trade-with 
countries outside SACU. ’ J
■ : - - - ■ ■ * « * * * £ ' ■
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TABLE 1: IMF-Sponsored.Programmes Which Include Interbank and Auction Arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa'
Form of 
Arrangement
Exchange Rate 
Determination
Role of 
Central Bank 
Intervention
Foreign Exchange. 
Surrender 
Requirements
The Gambia Interbank (1) Negotiable between 
banks and their 
clients
No intervention 
to influence the - 
exchange, rate
100% of goods and services 
to comnercial banks except 
: for some tourism proceeds; 
receipts of Marketing Board - 
to the central bank
Ghana Auction (weekly) (1) Dutch auction . . Possible by adjusting 
the amount of foreign 
exchange supplied to 
. the auction
100% of all receipts to the 
central bank
Guinea Auction (weekly) (1) Marginal auction Possible by adjusting 
the amount of foreign 
exchange supplied to 
the auction
Joint ventures in the mining 
sector pay a special export 
tax amounting to 40% of 
'export proceeds; partial 
surrender requirements 
apply to other exports • ___
Nigeria Interbank (auction 
for oil receipts) (1)
Negotiable between . 
dealers and their 
clients: marginal ~ . 
price for successful 
bidders at auction
None in interbank; 
possible by adjusting 
the amount of-foreign 
exchange supplied to 
the auction
100% of all receipts to 
commercial banks
Sierra Leone Interbank v Negotiable between 
banks and their 
clients
None 100% of all receipts to 
 ^ commercial banks
Uganda Auction (weekly) ■ Marginal auction Possible by adjusting 
the amount of foreign 
exchange supplied to 
the auction
100% of goods and invisibles
Zaire Interbank (1) Negotiable between 
banks and their 
clients
Some intervention 
on the interbank 
market
Receipts of mining and oil 
- companies to the central 
bank; all other export and 
invisible proceeds to 
" coimercial banks
Zambia Auction ..(weekly) Began as marginal 
auction: but later 
moved to Dutch auction
Possible by adjusting 
the amount of foreign 
exchange supplied to 
the auction
All export and invisible 
proceeds to the central 
bank through coirniercial' 
banks, except for the 
■ retention .of privileges of- 
the mining company and 
exporters.of ”non-trad- 
itional" goods
(1) Still in effect as of December 31, 1987. '*
Source: Quirk, Peter, et al,.."Floating Exchange Rates'in Developing Countries: Experience with 
Auction and Interbank Markets," IMF Occasional Paper No. 53, May 1987.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF.FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS IN ZAMBIA :
Prior to 1975, Zambian controls on imports were limited to a differentiated 
tariff structure which placed high duties on luxury consumer goods and low 
duties on capital, and intermediate goods to encourage import substitution." 
With the large fall in copper prices-which began in 1975 and subsequent 
balance of. payments difficulties, import licensing was instituted and foreign 
exchange was allocated by an inter-ministerial committee which met quarterly 
(Colcough, 1988). This system lasted until the auction was established in 
October 1985.
Upon its inception, payments for oil, International Air Transport . 
Association (IATA) charges, TAZARA and TAZAMA (the Trans-Zambian railroad and 
fuel pipeline), ZCCM (the copper company), and the GRZ.were excluded from the 
auction. The weekly supply of dollars was fixed at US$5 million..In February 
1986, oil, TAZARA, and TAZAMA were included in the auction and the weekly 
supply of dollars was increased to US$9 million.
The GRZ and the Bank of Zambia (the reserve bank) soon became alarmed at 
the steady depreciation of the kwacha (see Figure 1). From a pre-auction 
(October 3,, 1985) base of K2.v2=US$l, the currency had fallen in value by 72.7% 
by mid-July 1986 to K8.07=US$1 V  The Bank of Zambia instituted severaj 
changes to stabilize the exchange rate. New documentation requirements were 
introduced, restrictions on the use of bank overdraft facilities were put in 
place, and overdue tax payments had to be paid up before bids would be 
considered. Most significantly, the reserve bank moved from a marginal system 
to a Dutch auction to discourage high bidding (Bank of Zambia, 1986).
Despite these attempts at stabilization, exchange rate depreciation 
accelerated until the auction was terminated^irt May 1987. The exchange rate . 
reached its lowest point in April 1987 when it fell to K21.01=US$1 -- 
representing a depreciation of 89.5% against the dollar from the pre-auction 
rate. . ' -
Several factors appear responsible for the failure of the exchange rate to 
stabilize. Copper and cobait prices continued to decline in 1986, further 
constricting the already tight supply of dollars for the auction. On the ~ 
demand side, the money supply increased at a 60% annual rate during ,the 
auction period, fueling the demand for dollars and exerting more downward 
pressure on the kwacha. This was due to the government's apparent 
unwillingness to raise interest rates to finance the budget deficit. Instead 
the deficit was financed by putting more money into circulation (Harber,
1988). In addition, some observers place a substantial amount of blame on the 
Bank of Zambia for "tampering" with the auction, beginning in July 1986. Most 
serious was the temporary but unsustainable infusion of more dollars into the 
auction which eventually led to delays in the release of dollars to successful 
bidders, the move to the Dutch auction, and the wholesale disqualification of 
bids which were judged to be too high. These measures alienated the donors 4
4 Calculated as 1 - Base Rate . '
New Rate
Kw
ac
ha
 P
er
 U
S.D
ol
lar
F I G U R E  1:. E x c h a n g e  R a t e  M o v e m e n t s  D u r i n g ' t h e '  A u c t i o n ,  
Z a m b i a  ( O c t o b e r  1 9 8 5  — Apr i l  1 9 8 7 ) '
2 0 - -
4--
'O J----- 1----- 1----- 1___|----- 1----- |-------|— H— H— 4 --1-------1----1— H----- 1------- 1----- i---- h— j—-+ -— I----- 1-------i---- )-— I—H ---- 1------- 1----- 1------1----- 1------1----- 1----- 1----- 1----H—H——
1 0 / 8 5  1 / S 6  4 / 8 6  7 / 8 6  > 1.0/86 . 4 / 8 7
- . Month/Year
S ou rce :  B an k  of Z a m b ia
5who were providing substantial sums of dollars to the auction, and damaged the 
confidence people had in the integrity of the auction. These moves, in 
combination with a constant barrage of negative publicity against the auction 
in the government-controlled national press, fueled fears that the auction 
would soon be abolished. This may have been partially responsible for 
additional deterioration of the exchange rate as participants bid high to get 
foreign exchange while the auction still existed (Sanderson, 1987).
In his May Day speech of 1987, President Kaunda announced Zambia's 
renunciation of the IMF agreement. Among other measures, the auction was 
terminated, the exchange rate was henceforth fixed at K8.00=US$1, and foreign 
exchange would once again be centrally allocated by an inter-ministerial 
committee. FEMAC would meet every two weeks to allocate dollars to companies 
which had submitted the necessary documentation through their commercial banks 
to the FEMAC secretariat. It is this system which is currently operating in 
Zambia.
III. METHODS EMPLOYED TO ANALYZE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ALLOCATIONS UNDER THE 
AUCTION AND FEMAC
A. Introduction
The main objectives of this paper are to determine which sectors, firm 
types, and commodities received relatively more foreign exchange under the two 
most recent allocation systems in Zambia. Another important goal is to 
describe what the business and trading environment has been like for companies 
in the food and agricultural sector under these two foreign exchange 
allocation systems. The data sources and methods employed in conducting^ 
analysis related to these goals are noted below.
B. Data Sources
Data for foreign exchange allocations under the auction and FEMAC were 
published in the Times of Zambia during much of the auctipn and for. all bi­
weekly FEMAC allocations to date. Beginning in June 1986, the Bank of Zambia 
decided to publish detailed auction results in the newspaper to insure 
fairness and inform the public about who was receiving foreign exchange. This 
practice has been continued during the FEMAC period and is widely applauded as 
a significant deterrent to the corruption that was alleged to be rampant under 
the pre-auction foreign exchange allocation system.
Newspaper clippings were available for auctions 37-58, and 60-68, covering 
the period June 20, 1986 through January,24, 1987. Allocations from FEMAC 1 
through FEMAC 22 (May 16, 1987 to March 10, 1988) were also acquired 
During each allocation period, lists of successful applications for foreign 
exchange included the following information for each entry: name of the 
applicant; amount of dollars granted; the bid rate of kwacha for dollars; the 5
5 The authors wish to thank Mr. Terry Gordon of Barclay's Bank and Dr. 
James Snell of USAID for lending us newspaper clippings they had Saved.
sector of the company receiving the allocation; and a brief description of the. 
item(s) to be imported 5. . . .  ^ .
An additional variable for company ownership pattern was also included. 
Designations were: private Zambian company; trans-national corporation; 
agricultural cooperative; parastatal (100% GRZ-controlled); and mixed 
parastatal/private company. Designations for individual companies were 
acquired by consulting records and officials at .the. Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, the Export Promotion Board, annual reports of ZIMCO and INDECO (the 
two largest Zambian parastatal holding companies), and representatives of 
private companies. r - -
' C. Random Sampling Procedures and Statistical Analysis
Random samples of the auction and FEMAC periods were taken (Table 2). To 
address cross-sectoral questions, observations were taken from the entire set 
of, listings o^ foreign1 exchange allocations.during the two periods. For 
issues related solely to the agricultural sector, a separate sample was taken 
of only those companies engaged in agriculture and related industries '.
Cross-tabulation analysis which employs the Chi-Square statistic was . 
performed to measure the strength of association between foreign exchange 
allocation shares^to sectors, firm types, and commodities during the auction 
and under FEMAC. Because the figures generated are.the products of random 
sampling, one can only imply that they are correct within a certain margin of 
error. , Where official figures are available from the GRZ, statistical results 
have been cross-checked.
IV. COMPARISON OF ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO THE GENERAL ECONOMY UNDER 
THE AUCTION AND FEMAC ^
A. Allocation by Company Legal Status i
Historically, parastatal enterprises have played a prominent role in the 
Zambian economy. As of 1980, parastatal companies accounted for more than 50% 
of annual gross domestic product (GDP) in the food, textile, wood, chemical, 
and mining industries (Table 3) and for almost three--quarters of overall 
manufacturing and mining sector GDP. When mining is excluded, the. public 
contribution to manufacturing sector GDP is still a substantial 65%. 67
6 The bid rate varied during the auction, but has been fixed at
K8.12=US$1 under FEMAC. In addition, the company's sector was not identified 
during -the auction. However, this,can be inferred by cross-checking with the 
FEMACsdesignation for each company. • .
7 For this sample, the designation of "agriculture" was extended to 
include food processing companies and input manufacturers/distributors. These 
are usually classified as "manufacturing" companies by the Bank of Zambia.
As a result, one would expect that the parastatal share of foreign exchange 
allocations would be quite high and this is indeed the case under both the 
.auction and FEMAC (Table 4). The share of foreign exchange that went to 100% 
GRZ-owned parastatals and mixed companies (parastatals with some private 
• ownership) was roughly half of total funds allocated Under the auction. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the shares allocated in each period. Similarly, for 100% GRZ-owned 
companies and mixed companies examined separately,: there is no statistically 
significant difference in their percentage shares between the two foreign 
exchange allocation systems. ;
The widespread pre-auction fear that the parastatal sector would fare very 
poorly if forced to compete against the private sector for hard currency did 
not come to pass. Parastatal performance was decidedly mixed. In terms of 
exports, foreign exchange earnings rose during the auction for parastatals 
engaged in manufacturing, agriculture, transport, communications, trading, and 
hotels (Table 5). Overall parastatal foreign exchange earnings fell, but this 
is mostly attributable-.to reduced mining sector earnings resulting from 
falling copper prices. Parastatal foreign exchange earnings net of mining 
rose by more, than 30% from 1984/85 to 1986/87.
The difference, in combined private shares (locally-owned companies and 
TNC's) under the auction (46.6%) and FEMAC (42.2%) is also statistically non­
significant. However, when this is broken down, the share of foreign exchange 
allocated to TNC's fell significantly under FEMAC and was for the most part 
re-apportioned to Zambian-owned private enterprises. This lends credence to 
the position of a number of TNC representatives1 who stated that under FEMAC 
the GRZ is actively discriminating against TNC's. Alternatively, this may 
support repeated claims by government officials, the.national press, and some 
local businessmen that'the main beneficiaries of the auction system were 
expatriate companies which were better able to marshall financial resources 
and management expertise to operate in the difficult economic environment 
created by the auction. -
B. Allocation by Sector ,
Prior to the auction, the manufacturing sector-dominated foreign exchange 
allocations, receiving as much as 46% of import licenses in 1981 (Table 6) °. 
Although there was a fair amount of variation, transport/ communications was 
generally a distant second, followed by mining, agriculture, and food imports. 
Manufacturing's share, of imports seems to. have risen substantially during '.the 
auction (Table 7). This may be partially due to a desire to rehabilitate 
plants which had.not received substantial investment in a number of years due 
to lack of foreign exchange availability. Moreover, with the decontrol of 
, pricesKthe manufacturing/sector was able to pass on higher hard currency
® Before the auction, the import licensing and foreign exchange 
allocation processes were separate. As a result, there were continual, backlogs 
of companies holding import licenses,:but.no foreign exchange. This explains 
the divergence between total authorizations and actual imports in Table 6.
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TABLE 2: Structure of Random Samples Taken from the Auction and FEMAC 
Foreign Exchange Allocation Lists, Zambia
Decision Rule for Inclusion 
in the Sample
% of Population, 
Sampled
Number of 
Observations Period Covered
All Sectors: ■
- Auction Every 50th allocation 2% . '275 - 20/6/86-24/1/87.
- FEMAC Every 25th allocation. ' ' ' 4% 241 _16/5/87-10/3/88
Ag. Sector Only:
- Auction Every 5th ag.'firm listed 20% 268 20/6/86-24/1/87
- FEMAC Every 5th ag. firm listed 20% . -■ 269 16/5/87-10/3/88
Source of Data:.Times of Zambia (various issues).
TABLE 3: Public/Parastatal and Private GDP by Branch of Mining and Manufacturing Sector Industry, Zambia (1972 - 1980)
(Millions of Constant 1977 Kwacha) ' '
Total, All Sectors -• P.ubl ic/Parastatal Private
Industry Branch • •1972 1975 1980 1972 1975 1980 1972 1975 ■ 1980
Mining (1) 591-4- 293.5 310.1 538.6 229.6 258.0 52 ..8 63.9 - 52.1
Food, Beverages, Tobacco . 180.6 163.5 147.3 135:8 114.7 106.0 44.8 48.8 41.4
Chemicals 38.1 61.9 - ,43.4 18.7 ■ 36.7 • 26.9 19.4 25.2 16.7
Textiles and Leather 25.2 33.1 42.0 0.4 5.8 24.2 24.8 27.3 17.8
Paper and Printing 12.1 ' 14.8 . 13.2 , 1.1 2.9 3.5 11-.0 11.9 9.7
Wood and Furniture ■ 8.8 • 14.1 ' 9.9 3.0 4.7 ' 5.1 5.8 9.4 4.8
Other 0.4 ' 1.7 .0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.7 0.9
TOTAL 856.5 582.6 566.8 ' 697.6 394.4 423.7 159.0 188.2 143.4
(1) Public/parastatal figrues include only copper mining. From 1970-84,
copper accounted for 86.1% of total value of Zambian mineral production.
Source: World Bank, "Zambia: Industrial Policy apd Performance," June 1984-; 
CSO Zambia, "Country P'rofile: Zambia 1985," September 1986.
ID
TABLE 4: Allocation of Foreign Exchange Under the Auction and FEMAC 
■ by Company Ownership Patterns Zambia 
(Percentage Shares)
Company
Ownership Pattern
% of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During Auction
% of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During FEMAC
Mixed .Parastatal/Private 31.0% _  33.9%
Private Zambian (*) v 24.2% —  30.2%
Parastatal (100% GRZ) ■21.8% ' 20.6%
Transnational (**) 22.4% 14.9%
Other (1) 0.7% 0.4% ,
Notes: Calculations are products of random sampling and are thus subject to. 
sampling error.
(1) Comprised of agricultural cooperatives and educational- institutions. 
(*) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 85% level.
(**) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 95% level.
Source: Times of’ Zambia (various issues) and authors' calculations.
TABLE 5: Sectoral Foreign Exchange Earnings of Parastatals, Zambia
1984/85-1986/87 
(Millions of US. Dollars)
Sector 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Mining 829.0 763.7 688.0
Transport 26.0 34.8 46.3
Manufacturing. n.7 ' 19.1 . 26.9 ;
Energy 39.4 ■ 30.0. 26.5
Communications ----5.3 . 6.2. 9.7
Trading 1.8 4.2 4.4
Hotels 2.4 5.0 4.2
Finance 4.8 1.0 1.6
Agriculture 0.2 o.i' ; 1.1
Construction 0.0 0.0 v 0.0
TOTAL 920.6 .864.1 808.7
Source: NCDP, "Economic Report 1987,’’ January 1988.
TABLE 6: Import,License Authorization and Actual Imports by Sector, Zambia (1979 - 1982)
(Millions of Constant il977 Kwacha)
1979' 1980 • 1981 1982
Sector ' Amount. Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
Manufacturing 104.1 28,7% 122.8 28.7% 127.5 46.4% 88.5 39.1%
Transport/Communications 92.1
'N
51.7
25.4% 103.8 24.3% 20.2 7.3% 35.9 15.9%
Mining Suppliers 14.3% 68.4 16.0% • 16.7 6.1% 26.4 11.6%
Agriculture and Fertilizer 41.0 11.3% 57.0 13.3% 55.5 20.2% 21.5 9.5%
Food . 31.7 8.8% 31.6 7.4% 12.0 . 4.4% , 19.4 8.6%
Trading/General Consumers 16.6 4.6% 7.6 1.8% 19.8 7.2% 17.3 7.7%
Services 14.1 3.9% 17.1 4.0% 10.3 3.8% • 9.8 4.3%
Construction - ,11.0 3.0% 19.0 4.4% 12.5 4.5% ■ 7.6 3.4%
TOTAL AUTHORIZATIONS 362.3 100.0% 427.2 100,0% 274.6 100.0% 226.6 100.0%
ACTUAL IMPORTS (1) 412.9 550.1 549,0
/ ■
512.4
• (1) Actual imports exceed total authorizations because some imports were purchased 
with import licenses from previous years.
Source: World Bank, "Zambia: Industrial Policy and Performance," June 1984.
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TABLE 7: Allocation of Foreign Exchange Linder the Auction and FEMAC By Sector, Zambia
(Percentage Shares)
Sector
of Foreign Exchange. 
Allocated During Auction 
(Sample Figures)
% of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During FEMAC 
(Sample Figures) (1)
% of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During FEMAC 
(Official Figures) (1)
Manufacturing (**) ■ 54.3% 65 6% 46.5%
Transport/Communications (***) 12.0% . 5.0% 6.9%.
Mining (2) 11.4% 7.4% 7.8% ,
Agriculture 7.5% 7.6% 9.7% (3)
Banking/Finance 5.4% 3.1% ■ 5.7%
Energy 3.1% 3.6% 4.8%
Other Services 2.9% 4.5% 14.1%
Trading 2.5% 2.'5% 2.4%
Construction 0.7% 0.3% 2.0%
Health and Education 0.2% 0.3% NA
Notes: Calculations are products of random sampling and.are thus subject to
sampling error.
{**) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 95% level between 
the two sets of sample figures.
(***) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 99% level -between 
. the two sets of sample figures.
(1) Sample figures differ from official figures because: sample figures 
include Main Application allocations, whereas official figures also 
include 50% Retentions; No Funds Involved, and PTA allocations; 
official allocations to the "service" sector include some commodities 
destined for other sectors; official figures are for the period
May 1, 1987 to March 31, 1988 while sample figures are for May 1, 1987 
to March 10, 1988; and sampling error. Neither set of figures .
. include direct allocations to government.
(2) Represents foreign exchange allocated to companies that supply 
equipment and materials to ZCCM. ZCCM is excluded because they 
retain a portion of their export earnings for direct imports.
("3) If the $9 million allocated'to agriculture in March 1988 through 
a special EC facility is excluded, this figure falls to 7.6 percent.
Source: For sample figures. Times of Zambia (various issues) and authors' calculations;
For official figures, NCDP Progress Reports No. 1 and 2 on implementation
■of the Interim National Development Plan!
costs to consumers and thus generate sufficient kwacha to bid for foreign 
exchange in subsequent auctions (Bank of Zambia, 1986).
The sectoral allocation of foreign exchange did not change very much under 
the auction when compared, with FEMAC. While the share of foreign exchange 
allocated to manufacturing.has risen substantially under FEMAC (from 54% -
during the auction to 65% currently), and the transport/communications sector 
did relatively better during the auction (12% then versus 5% now), no other 
shifts in sectoral allocations are observable. "
t At the sectoral level, agriculture's share of foreign exchange during the 
auction fell when compared with 1979-1982 import license figures, and remained 
unchanged with the advent of FEMAC. The Bank of Zambia attributed 
agriculture's performance in the first year of the auction to a number of 
factors: unattractive producer prices; the smaill number of commercial farmers 
in Zambia; and low liquidity in the dominant smallholder sub-sector. These 
issues will be discussed in more detail in Section V.
To some extent, these figures heed to be approached with caution. The Bank 
of Zambia's grouping of companies under the "manufacturing" Sector is quite 
sweeping. The performance of manufacturing can have significant consequences 
for other sectors due to linkages. For example, NCZ (the fertilizer company), 
cereals millers, textile mills, cigarette companies, and agricultural 
equipment manufacturers fall under the manufacturing classification. However, 
their performance has obvious ramifications for the more narrowly defined 
"agricultural sector". Moreover, although the auction and "Main Application" 
allocations under FEMAC have been the main sources of foreign exchange during 
the period under examination, potential importers have access-to several other 
sources o'f foreign exchange. Exporters may retain 50% of foreign exchange 
earnings and use these hard currencies as they wish. In addition, the "No 
Funds Involved" category is for companies and individuals who have external 
sources of hard currency (such as overseas bank accounts) 9 . For companies 
that do considerable exporting, many of their-imports are financed through the 
50 Percent Retention Programme whereby 50% of hard currency earnings do not 
have to be surrendered by exporters to the reserve bank, but can be . 
immediately used for purchase of additional imports. Within agriculture, 
companies such as the Zambia Sugar Company and commercial farming enterprises 
involved in vegetable, fruit, and livestock export have financed many of their 
imports through this programme.
For the FEMAC period, percentage shares generated by the sampling procedure 
were compared with official GRZ figures to determine whether the sample 
accurately identified sectoral allocations GRZ figures include Main 
Applications, PTA Funds, 50 Percent Retentions, and No Funds Involved ; 
allocations whereas the sample was taken fronv the Main Applications only.
9 In general, the bulk of these imports are consumer goods purchased by 
private individuals.
Official figures on sectoral allocations during the auction are not 
avaiTable. .
Comparison of the second and third columns of Table 7 reveals that the 
sample overstates the share of foreign exchange jallocated to manufacturing 
during FEMAC. This is because manufacturing depends almost exclusively on 
Main Applications as a source of foreign exchange. Therefore its share would 
be smaller in the GRZ figures which includes all sources of foreign exchange. 
While the share of foreign exchange allocated to manufacturing varies between 
the sample and official figures, its dominant first place ranking is beyond 
dispute. This needs to be considered in light of the GRZ proclamation in its 
New Economic Recovery Programme that manufacturing would only receive third 
priority behind agriculture and mining.
A second discrepancy concerns the "service" sector which has received a 
significantly greater share of foreign exchange according to official figures. 
However this is essentially a problem of commodity classification. In October 
1987, the National Commission for Development Planning stated in its first 
progress report on the recovery programme:
...a look at items placed under the service sector has revealed a 
problematic situation. Items like medicines, education books and 
scientific journals, and some industrial.raw materials have appeared 
under the service sector.
Beyond these two problems, sectoral percentage shares and rankings do not 
differ too widely when comparing sampling and official figures. Although 
agriculture's percentage share appears higher using the official figures, this 
is accounted for by an EC grant of US$9 million to agriculture in March 1988. 
When this is removed, agriculture's share falls from 9.7 to 7.6% which is the 
same as the sample figure.
C. Allocation by Commodity Imported
Foreign exchange allocation shares to broad groupings of commodities under 
the auction and FEMAC are displayed in Table 8. The big loser under. FEMAC 
appears to be financial and transport charges The fall in this category's 
share during FEMAC probably results from a combination of two factors. First, 
as mentioned in the previous section, the transport sector has fared 
significantly worse since the demise of the auction and this is here reflected 
in a decline in funds to pay for transport services. Secondly, one would 
expect the continued economic deterioration in Zambia since May 1987 to be 
strongly reflected in a deterioration of the financial sector's performance.
Industrial inputs (variable cost items such as raw materials, chemicals, 
and other intermediate goods) have received a relatively greater share of 
foreign exchange under FEMAC, rising from approximately 35% during the auction 
t;o 44% currently. There is also evidence that the share of foreign exchange 
apportioned to spare parts has risen during FEMAC.
9
I* Financial-charges include requirements of the banking and insurance 
sectors as well as dividend payments, personnel recruitment expenses, and 
consultants' fees.
TABLE 8: Allocation Of Foreign Exchange Under the Auction and FEMAC 
; By Commodity Type, Zambia 
; . ■ (Percentage Shares)
% of Foreign Exchange % of Foreign Exchange.
Type of Carmodity Allocated During Auction - . Allocated During FEMAC
Industrial Supplies •(**) 35.6% 44.2%
Financial Charges (Inc. Transport) (***) 29.4% 13.8%
Spare Parts (*) 18:4% ' ; > . 24.6%
Capital Goods 12.3% 12.2%
.Consumer Goods 4.0% 4.6%
Notes: Calculations are products of random sampling and are thus subject to 
sampling error. . ,•
(*) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 90% level. ' 
(**) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 95% level.
(***) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 99% level.
Source: Times of Zambia (various issues) and authors' calculations.
If industrial supplies are broken down by primary (i.e., raw materials) 
versus processed (relatively more value added), there is evidence that the 
share going to primary supplies has fallen during FEMAC (from 12.5% to 7.5%) 
while hard currency going to imports of processed industrial supplies has 
risen from 22% to 32% under FEMAC. In other words, more value added is being 
imported at present while less value is being added locally. This is 
consistent with the pre-auction view that the overvalued kwacha is depressing 
competitiveness of local import-substituting industries.
Also of interest are the commodity categories for which no discernible 
changes occurred —  consumer goods-and capital goods. There is a widespread 
belief in Zambia that the auction was abused by greedy traders and profligate 
'private individuals who squandered scarce foreign exchange on. luxury 
consumer goods. In other words, the market failed to allocate foreign 
exchange in a manner consistent with the long-term interests of a society 
concerned with productive growth and development. This analysis indicates 
that imports of consumer items were not significantly different during the two 
periods and were only in the range of 4 to 5% of total imports which were 
purchased with auction funds and Main-Application funds during FEMAC.
In its review of the first year of the auction, the Bank of Zambia (1986) 
estimated the share of consumer goods imported with auction funds at 6% and 
stated the following:
In the first few months after the introduction of the auction system 
and the accompanying liberalization of the trade and payments system, 
the country was flooded with imported foodstuffs and other consumer 
goods which were, in most cases, out of reach to the ordinary Zambian. 
Without being supported by any statistics, the auction system was solely 
held responsible, for the reappearance on shelves of this assortment of 
commodities. ..... such an allegation can hardly be supported by the 
available data on the distribution of auctioned foreign exchange.
Similarly, neither System was significantly better at increasing 1 
allocations of foreign exchange to long-run investment items such as capital 
goods: their share remained unchanged at roughly 12% under both systems.
D. Conclusions
While much changed under the two systems of allocating foreign exchange, . 
much also.remained the same. Although consumer goods were more available in. 
local markets, the auction was not responsible for their presence. The bulk 
of these goods were imported through the "No Fundis Involved" mechanism which 
is used by companies and individuals who have external sources of foreign - 
currency (see section IV.B. above). Although a somewhat greater share of 
foreign exchange has been devoted to the importation of intermediate goods 
under FEMAC, the difference is not huge. Although TNC's captured a larger 
share of foreign exchange during the auction than under FEMAC, the share going 
to parastatal enterprises did not fall precipitously as had been feared . 
prior to the auction, Finaily, allocations were considerably higher to the 
transport/communications sector during the.auction and considerably lower for
manufacturing. However, allocation shares remained unchanged for all other 
sectors.
That sectoral shifts were not as great as had originally been anticipated 
should not necessarily be surprising. The auction lasted only nineteen 
months. Movement to a flexible exchange rate regime implies profound 
structural change that would perhaps take five to ten years to fully manifest 
itself. It is possible that there would eventually have been significant 
shifts of resources to sectors with great potential such as agriculture if the 
auction had been allowed to last longer.
V. COMPARISON OF ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
UNDER THE AUCTION AND FEMAC '
A. Classification of Companies as Part of the Food and Agricultural Sector
As stated earlier, the Bank of Zambia's classification of manufacturing 
enterprises is quite broad, including a number of companies which are of 
critical importance to the food and agricultural sector. In this section, 
analysis of "agricultural" sector companies goes beyond the Bank of Zambia's 
narrow classification to-include agricultural input manufacturers (such as 
NCZ) and food processors (such as NMC, other cereals millers and meat -packers 
such as the Lusaka Cold Storage Commission). There is a problem with this 
classification as some companies manufacture both food-related commodities and 
non-food items. This makes it very difficult to identify the end use of an 
imported input or capital good as agricultural or non-agricultural. This is 
dealt with as follows. An allocation to a company such as RQP Industries (a 
parastatal that manufactures both soap and cooking oil) for imports of 
soybeans would be included in the agricultural sector sample frame while an 
allocation for detergents, general spare parts, or capital goods would not. 
While it is obvious that detergents do not have a food-related end use, spare 
parts and capital goods are more problematic as there is a distinct 
possibility that they could be at least partially used for food processing. 
Nevertheless, such allocations were not included in the agricultural sector 
sample frame. d ■ ’
B. Allocation by Company Ownership Pattern
As is the case with a number of other sectors in the Zambian economy, 
parastatal, enterprises dominate the formal food sector. The parastatal share 
of overall GDP in the food, beverage, and tobacco sector ranged between 70-75% 
during the 1970's (see Table 3). While the percentage share of parastatal GDP 
in overall agricultural- GDP (which includes informal activity) is not that 
large (roughly 35% in 1980), government involvement with smallholders through 
parastatal marketing boards such as NAMBOARD (maize, other grains, and 
fertilizer distribution) and LINTCO (cotton) is extensive.
•V. .
Reflecting its prominent position in the food sector, the foreign exchange 
share for parastatal and, mixed parastatal/ private companies was nearly half 
(47.6%) of allocations tofood sector-related companies during the auction
. II '•
(Table 9). This has risen to 58.7% under FEMAC,' supporting claims that the 
committee has actively favored parastatal companies*2.
. While private companies enjoyed greater access to foreign exchange during. 
the auction (receiving 51.3%), they have seen their share plummet to 36.9% 
since the beginning of FEMAC operations. Within the private sector, the TNC's 
have seen their allocation share fall precipitously under FEMAC. This 
parallels developments in the general economy, but the reduction in TNC shares 
has been more pronounced in agriculture (from 34.6 to 20.8%) than in the 
economy as a whole (.from 22.4 to 14.9% -- see Table 4). Meanwhile there has 
been no discernible decline in the, share going to locally-owned private 
companies under FEMAC.
While 100% foreign^owned. TNC subsidiaries operating in Zambia have fared 
relatively worse under FEMAC, mixed companies haved fared relatively better. 
Their share has risen from 24.6% during the auctiorito 40.8% under FEMAC.: 
Because most private shares in mixed companies are held by TNC's, in one sense 
it can be said that TNC's have not been uniformly discriminated against.
The percentage share allocated to 100% GRZ-owned companies has not been 
significantly different between the auction and FEMAC.
C. Allocation by -Economic Activity Within Agriculture
Enterprises were also classified according to their major activity within 
the food and agricultural sector (Table 10). There is. some, evidence that 
input dealers/mahufacturers have received somewhat less foreign exchange under 
FEMAC (falling from 51.7 to 44.3%). Disaggregation reveals that the-decline 
in allocations to agro-chemical dealers/manufacturers has been dramatic. 
Whereas agro-chemical companies received 23% of foreign exchange allocations 
during the auction, their sharefihas fallen to a meager 7.6% under.FEMAC.
There are only a handful of agro-chemical companies in Zambia and most of them 
are TNC's. As stated above, TNC's have received significantly reduced foreign 
exchange allocation shares during FEMAC.
. D. Allocation by Commodity Imported
There is little difference in the commodities imported for the food and 
agricultural sector under the two foreign exchange allocation systems (see 
Table 11). Only financial charges registered a significant fall in shares 
declining from 12% during the auction to less than 4% under FEMAC. As with 
the fall in shares devoted to financial charges across sectors, this is 
perhaps explained by the decline registered by the transport sector under 
FEMAC. ' • ■ 12
12 During our interviews, a number of people stated that if a private, 
company seeking a FEMAC allocation failed to provide a supporting letter from 
a parastatal verifying that the requested imported goods were to be used by 
that parastatal, the chances of approval were virtually nil.
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TABLE 9: Allocation of Foreign Exchange Under the Auction and FEMAC to the Food 
and Agricultural Sector By Company Ownership Pattern, Zambia 
(Percentage Shares') . '
Legal Status
. % of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During Auction
% of:.Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During FEMAC
Transnational (***) 34.6% . 20.8%
Mixed Parastatal/Private (***) 24.6% 40.8%
Parastatal (100% GRZ) '23.0% 17 .'9%
Private Zambian
"N.
16.7% 16..1%
Agricultural Cooperatives 1.1% 4.4% .
Notes: Calculations are 
sampling error. 
(***) Chi-square
products of random sampling and are thus subject to 
statistic significantly different at 99% level.
Source: Times of Zambia. (various issues) and authors' calculations:
TABLE 10: Allocation of Foreign Exchange Under the Auction 
and Agricultural Sector By Sub-Sector Firm-Type, 
(Percentage Shares)
and FEMAC to the Food 
Zambia
Sub-Sector Firm-Type
% of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During Auction
%  of Foreign Exchange 
Allocated During FEMAC
Input Dealers/Manufacturers (*) 51.7% ■ 44.3%
Food Processors - 34.5% ■ 39.1%
Crop and Livestock Producers 13.7% 16.6%
Notes: Calculations are products of random sampling and are thus subject to 
sampling error.
(*) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 90% level. 
Source: Times of Zambia'(various issues) and authors" calculations..
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TABLE 11: Allocation of Foreign Exchange Under the Auction and FEMAC to the Food 
and Agricultural SectorBy Commodity Type, Zambia 
(Percentage Shares)
- ' % of Foreign Exchange . ' , % of Foreign Exchange
Type of Commodity' Allocated During Auction Allocated During FEMAC
Industrial Supplies (*) 30.2% . 38.9%
Spare Parts 23.7% 23.6%
Capital Goods ' • 21.6% 25.1%
Food arid Beverages 12.5% . 8.5%
Financial Charges (Inc. Transport) (***) 12.0% • '3.8%
Notes:-Calculations are products of random sampling and are thus subject to 
sampling error. 7 .
■ ■ ' ( * )  Chi-square statistic significantly different at 90% level.
(***) Chi-square statistic significantly different at 99% level.
Source: Times of Zambia (various issues) and authors' calculations.
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Although agro-chemical companies have received substantially less foreign 
exchange under FEMAC, chemical imports have not decreased in a statistically 
significant way. Increasingly private individuals and businesses which are 
not primarily agro-chemical companies have been importing directly, as opposed 
to buying from an agrorchemical company. During the auction, farmers were 
allowed to import directly and apparently this trend has accelerated under 
FEMAC 13.
There is mild.evidence that imports of variable cost items other than spare 
parts increased under FEMAC and this may be for the same reason that this . 
happened across sectors. Reappearance of a seriously overvalued exchange rate 
during the FEMAC^period has reduced competitiveness of domestic import- 
substituting industries, making, it more financially attractive to import such 
items instead. ■
D. Insights from Interviews
A purely statistical analysis provides an incomplete picture of why some 
types of companies and commodities fared better under one foreign exchange 
allocation system than under another; To obtain a better understanding of the 
nature of the trading environment.since the advent of the auction in 1985, 
representatives from 25 companies involved in food industries and agriculture, 
the Bank of Zambia, donor organizations, and farm interest groups were 
interviewed during December 1987 and March 1988. In comparing the business^ 
climate during and since the auction, respondents voiced concern in four.broad 
rareas which they felt were important in explaining the performance of the food 
and agricultural sector: the structure of producer incentives which was a 
function of changing input costs and output prices; the ability to plan, future 
activities; increased administrative costs under FEMAC; and the priority given 
by the GRZ and FEMAC to agriculture. Let us examine each of these.
1. Input Costs and Output Prices
Several respondents believed that one reason the agricultural sector as a 
whole did not respond as favorably to the auction as. one might have hoped was 
because the costs of imported inputs were allowed to increase as the kwacha 
depreciated, while the producer price for maize remained controlled ,. 
Although the producer price for maize rose by 41.2% between 1985/86 and 
1986/87 (Republic of Zambia, 1988), farmers were squeezed as this was.
13-According to the.data sampled, agro-chemical companies imported 88.3% 
of all^agro-chemicals during the auction. This fell to less than 50% under 
FEMAC. While the authors doubt that this order of magnitude in erosion of 
agro-chemical market share is accurate, interviews with agro-chemical company 
and farmer interest group representatives confirm that direct importation by 
individual farmers has been on the rise. .
^  GRZ-decreed producer prices for all other crops served only as 
minimum-guaranteed flobr prices. However, because private marketing is under 
developed in Zambia, many commercial crops, could only be sold to the govern­
ment marketing boards. Therefore, the floor price became the effective price.
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insufficient to keep pace with inflation on the input side where costs for 
some imported items^had doubled or tripled by April 1987.
While commercial maize farmers may have done poorly- during the auction 
commercial farmers who devoted more resources to export crops did well. Local 
currency depreciation may have hurt them on the input side, but they made up 
for this by exporting at an attractive exchange rate. As of early 1987, the 
Export Growers' Association estimated that the value of horticultural exports 
had more than doubled since the auction,began. ZAMHORT, a parastatal that 
deals in fruit and vegetable trade, exported 438.3 MT in 1985/86 versus only 
16.1 MT in 1984/85 (Weidemann et al., 1987). 1986 was the first year that 
ZAMHORT turned a profit 1°. With the establishment of FEMAC and the 
reappearance of a fixed exchange rate that is overvalued, these farmers and 
their suppliers are now experiencing’substantially reduced profit margins. 
While incentives to export have been drastically curtailed, input costs have 
not fallen. As one respondent explained, when the kwacha was revalued to 
K8=US$1 from K20-US$1, export returns automatically fell. However input 
dealers did not reduce prices accordingly. While export prices in local 
currency terms are currently one third of what they were in April 1987, input 
dealers continue to base their prices on an exchange rate of K20-25=US$1 more 
than one year after the revaluation.
2. The Planning Capacity of Businesses
Respondents were split over the question.of whether operating under the 
auction or FEMAC was more conducive to being able, to plan future business 
activities. All of those interviewed agreed that it was extremely difficult 
to carry out budgeting exercises or issue future price quotations to potential 
customers during the auction due to the rapid depreciation of the kwacha. For 
example, a company might order some imported item on the basis of an exchange 
rate of K5=US$1, and by the time the item arrived three weeks later, be forced 
to pay for it at K7=US$1. In such an environment, short-term business 
planning for as little as six to twelve months into the future was largely 
futile. - .•
A representative of one of the major agro-chemical companies reported that 
his company had a cash-flow problem over the duration of the auction. 
Ironically, this-might not have occurred if the auction had.begun during some 
other period of the year. The marketing of chemicals is seasonal with the 
fourth quarter being the busiest and the second quarter being the slowest.
The auction started in October 1985 and the company had ordered chemicals in 
August/September for the 1985/86 crop year. When they ordered, imports were 
based on an exchange rate of K2=US$1. However, when they had to pay for the 
imports in October/November, the exchange rate had shot up to K5=US$1 and they
Because smallholders are less dependent on imported inputs than 
commercial farmers and fertilizer subsidies remained in place during the 
auction period, they felt less cost pressure on the input side arid responded 
more positively to producer price increases.
Personal communication. -
found themselves having a big shortage of kwacha for bidding on the auctions 
The firm sold a lot of chemicals at the prices set in September 1985.'; They 
raised prices slightly in Tate 1985 and received some kwacha on sales based on 
an exchange rate of K2-5=US$1. The following year, the exchange rate was \  
approximately K15=US$1 and the previous year's sales which were based on the 
much lower exchange rate were insufficient for bidding for imports to be used 
during the 1986/87 crop year^ If by chance the auction had begun in the 
second quarter of 1986 (the firm's slow period), the company might have done 
much better under the auction because they would have had time to adjust their 
import orders based on a more appropriate exchange rate.
Despite such problems, if one was willing to pay enough kwacha, priority 
items such as spare £arts could be obtained with speed and certainty. As one 
representative of a farmer interest group put it, when a farmer's tractor 
breaks down in the middle of the planting season, the cost of a necessary 
spare part is no object -- timely availability is the overriding concern. In 
this sense, the auction was superior to FEMAC.
One strategy followed by a number of companies which bid regularly on the 
auction was to bid high for priority items (about 10% above the previous 
week's exchange rate) so that one was sure to get them in the same week's 
allocation and bid low for non-priority items for which one could perhaps 
afford to wait a bit if the bid was unsuccessful. Money wastrel eased one week 
after a successful bid and the importing process could then begin/.
Under FEMAC, exchange rate uncertainty has been reduced and this has made 
the planning process somewhat easier. However, most company representatives 
were sure that there would be a major devaluation sometime after the national 
elections later,this year. As long as the kwacha remains seriously '
overvalued, exchange rate uncertainty will continue to be a major concern for 
Zambian businesses.because nobody can predict the date of a devaluation nor 
its magnitude. .
If a company had enough kwacha to bid during the auction, it was a  ^
certainty that foreign exchange would.be available for essential inputs. Now. 
even with sufficient kwacha, there is no guarantee of receiving an allocation. 
Many company representatives felt that this severely hindered their capacity 
to plan.-JTNC representatives felt especially strongly because they are of the. 
opinion that.FEMAC is discriminating against them in allocation decisions.
Even if a company is granted an allocation, the question of timely release 
of funds remains. While everybody agrees that FEMAC is a vast improvement 
over the system that was in place prior to the auction, release of funds is 
slower than during the auction. Under .FEMAC, funds are not automatically 
transferred to commercial banks, so letters of credit can not be quickly 
confirmed. The procedure is as follows: foreign exchange is deposited in a 
Targe New York bank by the Bank of Zambia. When FEMAC approves a foreign 
exchange allocation, funds are then transferred from the New York bank to the, 
Zambian commercial bank of the company receiving the allocation. There can be 
delays during these transfers totalling as much as two to three-weeks from the 
time of foreign exchange allocation approval to final confirmation of the
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Tetter of credit. Suppliers will not begin processing an order until the 
letter of credit has been confirmed..
3. Overhead Costs .
For most companies, establishment of the FEMAC System has led to higher 
administrative costs. Because one can. never be sure of receiving an 
allocation the first time it is requested, companies apply for. foreign, 
exchange much earlier than,would be desirable if they could importswhenever , 
they wanted. This results in excessive interest charges which are passed on 
to farmers in the form of higher input prices. A representative of one of the 
agro-chemical companies stated that even though he would prefer to order 
imported chemicals in August and September for the approaching planting 
season, he will now begin ordering as early as February or March. His rule of 
thumb is basically to get an allocation whenever possible. A representative 
of another company involved in fresh produce exports stated that on a recent 
order, there was a K120,000 interest charge (US$15,000 at the official 
exchange rate) on a US$180,000 tractor purchase because funds were tied up for 
so long.
Because of the often lengthy lead time involved, a number of companies ask 
foreign suppliers to provide a price quotation valid for 60 to 90 days. This 
makes planning a bit easier, but results in an added cost as suppliers charge 
a slight mark-up for locking in this price^over the extended period. . .
Several company representatives felt that FEMAC required excessive . 
paperwork. In addition to pro forma invoices, applicants must submit a 
minimum of^s-ix other forms to the FEMAC Secretariat in multiple copies. As 
mentioned earlier, if a private company does not also submit letters frpm one 
or more parastatals in support of the foreign exchange application, chances.of 
FEMAC approval are slim. For foreign exchange requests in excess of 
US$20,000, firms must provide three price quotations to assure that suppliers 
are not charging too much. According to one company representative, many 
companies get around this by obtaining three different quotations from three 
subsidiaries of tbe same parent company. Many applications are rejected 
because the committee does not have the time to evaluate all the supporting 
documents in. a timely manner. In addition, they have very little technical 
expertise for evaluating the commodities that companies are planning to 
purchase’. According to this company representative, the more paperwork FEMAC 
staffers ask “for, the lower their ability, to get through it all.
The end result.is that every company must have extra cash solely earmarked 
for inflated interest costs and for processing foreign exchange applications 
to FEMAC. A,lot of capital can be tied up in just bidding and getting 
refused. Table 12 illustrates this problem using data obtained from one of 
the companies interviewed. For FEMAC's 1 through 17, finance charges 
resulting, from tying-up capital in the application process totalled 
approximately 5% of the amount of dollars actually allocated; to the company
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TABLE 12: FEMAC Applications, Estimated Finance Charges, and Approvals 
for a Representative Company, Zambia ' .
(US Dollars)
FEMAC
Sitting
Date- Amount of 
Application
Estimated 
Finance Charges
A m o u n t ' 
Approved
1- 16-5-87 78,000 546 0
' 2 30-5-87 78,000 546 39,000
- 3 13-6-87 0 0 . 0
4 27-6-87 - .97,200 680 -' 24,600
5 11-7-87 126,600 886 54,600
6 25-7-87 157,200 1,100 • 136,800
7 7-8-87 312,000 .2,184 60,000.
8 28-8-87 126,000 • 882 • 0
9 ’ 5-9-87 332,400 , 2,327 . 0 :
.10 • ' 19-9-87 3.53,400 2,474 0
11 3-10-87 374,400 2,621 - 0
' 12 ' 17-10-87 331,800 2,323 • - 0
13 31-10-87 - 511,200 . 3,578 141,000
14. 14-11-87 289,800 2,029 51,000
15 28-11-87 244,800 1,714'' 0
• 16 11-12-87 172,20.0 1,205 34,200
17 26-12-87 245,400. 1,718 . ' 0
TOTAL. 26,813 541,200
.
Finance Charges as %
of Amount Approved 5.0%
Notes: Finance charges calculated as 0.7% per FEMAC op 18% annually.
Source: Data supplied by one of the companies participating in the
■ University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University trader survey.
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17. There is a "snow-balling" effect as unsuccessful applicatipns are 
resubmitted along with new applications for .upcoming import requirements. 
Finapce charges may be actually understated because alljjeat ion si, were not 
necessarily granted at the most appropriate time consTdering the seasonal 
nature of agriculture and three to four month leadTtime requirements for7" v 
importation of most variable cost items. Whereas successful applications:;, 
through FEMAC 7 are timed more or less correctly, the FEMAC 13,i 14 and, 16d 
allocations are too late to be useful for the 1987/88 planting season. CD 
Additional expenses for storage will therefore' be incurred until just befbre 
the next season. O
■ While".it is inevitable that some funds will. be tied up regardless of what 
import procedures are in place, the only "excessive" finance charges during 
the auction were those attributable to bidding at an exchange rate below the 
market clearing rate for a given week. It is difficult to believe that 
finance charges.attributable solely to bidding for foreign exchange would have 
approached the levels currently experienced by importers under FEMAC.
The snow-balling effect mentioned above'is not an isolated phenomenon. In 
-Figure 2, the number of successful and unsuccessful Main Application bids are 
plotted for FEMAC/s 1 through 22 18. The gap is clearly growing between 
- demand for and supply of foreign exchange. As of FEMAC 32 (late July 1988), 
the number of unsuccessful bids had risen to 1286, while successful bids were 
only 314 19.
4. Prioritization of Agriculture '
Companies were divided over, the question of whether FEMAC attached 
sufficient priority to the agricultural sector. While some companies 
(especially TNC's) felt very strongly that FEMAC did not understand the 
critical need for the timely arrivalof agricultural inputs, others, felt that 
agriculture was getting its fair share, given the meager availability of 
foreign exchange. .
Evidence presented earlier suggests that agriculture's share of foreign 
exchange has not changed significantly with the establishment of FEMAC even 
though in its, Interim National Development Plan (for the period July 1987 to 
December 1988), the GRZ attaches first priority to allocating foreign 
exchange to the agricultural sector. Moreover, it does npt appear that 
; adequate consideration has been taken of the seasonal nature of agricultural 
input requirements. Figure 3 presents the monthly dollar amounts and 
percentage shares allotted to the agricultural sector from Majf 1987 to March 
1988. In general, higher dollar, levels and percentage.shares were apportioned 
to agriculture from November through March. However, due to the three to .four
*7 jhis figure is calculated using an 18% annual rate or 0.7% for. each 
FEMAC (as the'committee meets once every two weeks).
18 Unfortunately data on values of unsuccessful bids are not available.
19 Times of Zambia* July 28, 1988.
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month lag between opening a letter of credit and arrival of the goods in- 
country, relatively more should have been allocated during the May to 
September period. - .
One reason why agriculture has not received greater priority under FEMAC 
mayjiave to do with the fact that FEMAC allocates foreign exchange directly to 
individual companies. It is therefore difficult to see how the committee 
prioritizes across and within sectors. There is no formal flow of policy 
documents to the committee which deals with sectoral planning issues . In 
contrast, the Zimbabwean system of foreign exchange allocation includes a 
process.whereby representatives of:agricultural interest groups serve on an . 
Agricultural Input Prioritization Committee (AIPC) chaired by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. This committee formulates a recommendation for the aggregate- 
foreign exchange needs of the.agricultural sector for the upcoming allocation 
period. This recommendation is then carried tt an. inter-ministerial committee 
which allocates foreign exchange to each sector of the economy on a semi­
annual basis. The Ministry of Agriculture then allocates funds to individual 
companies based on AIPC recommendations and documentation provided by the 
companies seeking foreign exchange (Murphy, 1987) .
However, if a foreign exchange allocation system similar to that used in 
Zimbabwe were to be instituted, data needs and technical analysis requirements 
would probably be a significant burden for the Zambian bureaucracy to bear, 
given its scarce resources. Something akin to the Malawian foreign exchange 
allocation system might be a more realistic alternative for Zambia. Under 
this system, companies prepare an annual plan detailing monthly foreign- . 
exchange requirements. Each month, companies submit pro forma invoices to the 
reserve bank justifying that month's required allocation. If reserve bank 
officials are unable to allocate the full sum requested, they will instead 
identify approved commodities for importation from among the pro formas. With 
the smaller sum of foreign exchange granted, companies are then free-to 
prioritize what they will import from this approved list.. With this system, 
there is some room for both the government.and individual companies to 
prioritize and plan import needs. Moreover* the amount of paperwork is 
reduced as.less official scrutinizing of each and every pro forma invoice is 
required than under FEMAC. ^ ...
VI. KEY VARIABLES FOR EVALUATING POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF -FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
AUCTIONING ON OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN ECONOMIES
This section identifies factors that are important for thinking about the 
possible .effects of foreign exchange auctioning on the general economy and the 
agricultural sector. Hypotheses are generated as a function of lessons 
learned from the Zambian experience. These lessons are drawn from both 
analysis in this paper and from other studies which have examined the Zambian 
experience,as well as auctioning in other countries. To the extent that data
20 This situation may be changing as the Commercial Farmers Bureau 
recently submitted a schedule of agricultural sector requirements based on 
Interim National Development Plan targets (CFB, 1988). ZCCM has also submitted 
import requirement plans for the mining sector to FEMAC.
are ^ available, key indicators for the general economy and agricult^ e are then 
identified for ther SADCC'countries (Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzani- - in an 
effort to distinguish how these countries' economies differ from or are 
similar to that of Zambia and how their economies might adjust if they were to 
move from foreign exchange rationing to a floating exchange rate. This 
section proposes hypotheses to stimulate thought about possible effects of 
foreign exchange auctioning. Its purpose is not to predict outcomes of ; ' 
auctioning for any country. The interaction of the variables identified (and 
variables left unidentified for this is not meant to be an exhaustive list) is 
too complex for reliable prediction.
Table 13 identifies key variables and hypothesizes potential short and 
long-run effects that might result if a system of foreign exchange auctioning 
were introduced. Data for some variables can be identified prior to 
establishment of an auction (extent of currency overvaluation, export 
concentration, etc.) and are related to the pre-auction structure of the 
economy. Drawing on the Zambian experience, variables are also identified - 
which deal with the behavior of major actors during the implementation of an 
auction (money supply growth, budget deficit reduction, donor and government 
support for the reform process, etc.).
The degree of currency overvaluation is very important for providing an 
indication of the amount of adjustment that is likely to occur before the 
exchange rate stabilizes. The magnitude of currency overvaluation is most 
commonly calculated, using a purchasing power parity method where price levels 
between a country and its trading partners are compared. However, there are a 
number of conceptual difficulties with this approach-so results must be 
interpreted with caution (Krienen, 1983;). Aaother wayv to roughly indicate the 
degree of overvaluation is to compare official and parallel market exchange' 
rates. However, the parallel, market rate is not an entirely reliable 
indicator of the exchange rate that would exist under an official floating 
exchange rate regime. This is'because suppliers and demanders of parallel 
market hard currencies require a risk premium due to the possibility of 
getting caught and punished by the authorities (Roemer, 1984). Moreover, 
movement from a fixed to a floating exchange rate implies a degree of 
structural change that would significantly alter the nature of supply, demand, 
and investor confidence in the economy. ""
During implementation of,an auction, careful monitoring of macro-economic 
variables such as money supply growth, the budget deficit, and interest rate 
movements is critical. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, some analysts 
have suggested that the GRZ/s inability to limit money supply grdwth and the 
budget deficit was the main reason for the failure of the exchange rate to 
stabilize during the auction.' -
It is also important to understand linkages between fiscal, monetary^ and 
exchange rate- policy. If government expenditures are not reduced and taxes 
are not raised, official borrowing must increase. In the short-run, 
government can raise treasury bill rates which will siphon money from the 
economy, reduce non-governmental investment incentives, and dampen demand.for . 
foreign currency. Alternatively, the government can leave interest rates 
unchanged (or raise them at. a rate which does not keep pace with inflation),
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TABLE 13: Indicators for Effects of Moving from Foreign Exchange Rationing to Auctioning
Key Variables Hypothesized Shcr't-Run Effects . Hypothesized Long-Run Effects
For the general economy:
Degree of currency overvaluation The greater the overvaluation, movement 
prior to the auction - to market-determined exchange rates will:1
-increase domestic inflation;
-increase exports;
-decrease imports.
Degree of concentration of 
export revenues prior to 
the auction -
The more diversified the source's of 
revenues, the more widespread-the 
incidence of benefits.
Imports as percentage of GNP The higher the percentage, the : •
prior to the auction greater domestic inflation will be
(magnitude depends on import elasticity 
of demand).
Terms of trade for the ' Determines supply of dollars to the
country's exports during the auction. The greater the supply, the
auction . lower the levels of local currency
depreciation.
Level of foreign debt repayment' Determines supp'ly of dollars to the - 
obligations during the auction. The greater debt repayment
auction . requirements are, the more constricted
the supply of dollars,' leading to 
local currency depreciation.
The greater the money Supply growth, 
the greater the demand for dollars, . 
leading to local currency depreciation.
Money supply growth during 
the auction.
Size of government budget - See text for linkages to money supply
deficit during auction and . . growth, interest rates, and the exchange 
- actions taken to reduce it-. rate.
Unclear. .The exchange rate'may event-, 
ually stabilize at a rate consistent 
with purchasing power parity. On the 
other hand, severe fluctuations may 
continue due to uncertainties in 
the international economy.
Production shifts to-goods that the 
country can produce most-'ieff iciervtly, 
given its resource endowments.
Share of imports in GNP falls as 
import substitution occurs.
Same as in the short-run.
Currency, depreciation and 
inflation- can make the auction 
politically unsustainable.
Currency depreciation and 
inflation can make the auction 
politically-unsustainable.
Currency depreciation and 
inflation can make the auction 
politically unsustainable.
Employment
Level of donor financial 
support to the auction
Unemployment growth may be severe as 
industry contracts due to increased 
input prices and falling effective 
demand.
Increases supply of dollars, mitigating 
against local-currency depreciation. :
Employment shifts to sectors fn which 
. the country can produce most effic­
iently, given its resource endowments 
Employment levels will depend on 
whether these sectors are more or 
less labor-intensive than sectors 
from which workers migrated.
Helps ease transition' to a stable 
market-based exchange rate.
TABLE 13 continued: 
\
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Key Variables ^ Hypothesized Short-Run Effects Hypothesized Long-Run Effects
Extent of government 
comnitment to the auction
If government assumes an educating role, 
_citizens may become aware of reasons for 
short term sacrifice. J f  government 
abdicates this role, auction becomes 
scapegoat leading to lack of confidence 
in long-run prospects of the auction.
•. This fuels speculation-which contributes 
to local currency depreciation.
If government assumes an educating 
roleauction may become accepted as. 
exchange rate stabilzes. If govern­
ment abdicates responsibility, the 
■ auction may be abandoned with a 
return to-rationing.
For the agricultural sector: -
Extent of development of 
marketing infrastructure
The more developed the more rapid 
marketed supply response is to new 
price signals.
If the sector was-.taxed prior to 
the auction, improved incentives' 
will lead to increased investment 
in marketing infrastructure. If the 
sector was subsidized prior tc the 
auction, resources may move out of 
agriculture.
Extent of development of 
coranercial relative to 
smallholder farming .
The more prominent the role of commercial 
farmers, the greater the-supply response 
because most commercial'farm output is 
marketed.
A larger segment of smallholder 
farmers will move into the cash 
economy with increased price 
incentives.
Within smallholder sector, 
extent to which farmers are 
net sellers vs. net buyers
Net sellers will respond to higher prices 
with increased marketed output. Net buyers 
will experience decreased access to food 
due to inflation.'
Net sellers will shift resources 
into production of export crops.
- To'the extent possible, net 
.buyers will also shift resources 
into production of export crops, 
but may be impeded by low liquid­
ity, labor bottlenecks,- and.limited 
access'to improved, technology.
Level of dependence on 
imported inputs
Cost inflation will erode profitability 
but greater availability of spare parts 
will raise productivity.
Reduction in use of- imported 
inputs with greater substitution
of locally-produced inputs.
/
Producer price structure If prices remain controlled but do not 
keep pace with inflation, farmers incur 
losses.
Farmers shift resources to crops 
whose prices are not officially 
controlled. /
Value of imported inputs as 
a-percent of agricultural 
exports
. . \ '
The sector increases its share of foreign 
exchange allocations as it is able to 
effectively compete for foreign exchange.
If comparative advantage exists,- 
exports increase, and allocation 
shares rise accordingly!
’
TABLE 13 continued:
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Key Variables Hypothesized Short-Run Effects Hypothesized' LOng-Run Effects'
' '1 * ~ '
Share of. agriculture in . 
t&tai merchandise exports
If the share is high, increased! export 
re venues have a positive balance of. 
payments effect. If the'share is low, 
increased exports ha\(e little effect.
■ , •
If tta& shah's is high/, same, effect- 
' as' in short-run.:If bhare is low, 
it may .take marly years for a. 
significant pt>*tft1ve.balance ofv . 
.payments effect to.be felt. . '
Level of national self- 
sufficiency in staple foods
*■
The ldwer the self-sufficiency level,' 
the greater the amount of inflation for 
•food items.
i
\ ■ *
1 !
IrtfpoA flubsHttrCiofl $nd greater 
demand-ffer 'lttealiy-]S/bduced foods 
’ fta/ffedtjr..'. ffewdver 1f export ifops 
yreoma*ikrf4 fihahfela-lly attractive,, 
titddufitldfl Way ridve-away from ■ 
staple crops,.leading to greater 
dependents fin imports.
*
1
but increase domestic credit by expanding the money Supply. This dtfes hot 
dampen investment incentives, but with increased liquidity in the economy, 
exacerbates inflation, and runs the risk of raising demand for foreign 
exchange which in turn leads to further depreciation of. the Ideal currency. 
During the auction, the -GRZ chose this second alternative for financing its 
deficit (Harber, 1988).
Employment levels and costs of essential commodities' must ,also^be' 
monitored. Where possible, plans for subsidies targeted to vulnerable groups 
should be .introduced. However, effective targeting may be extr&aely difficult 
to implement. Identification of appropriate commodities, populations, 
payments procedures, and timing may be problematic 21,
Some explanation is necessary ConcerMh| dortbr support and* governmeftt , 
commitment. Some observers blame the.dontfrS tdl* Having td6 Hptdly,
without adequately considerating Zambian political realities. DiScusStrig the 
reform p^ dcesiiS in general, Colcough (1988; concludes:
• i.the Fund and the Bank (and by implication, all fethdb fio'ffku'ltatWe 
Group members) pushed Zambia too hard and too fa&t* the extent to which 
they pauperized the wage earning classes, and puphed .many-at the.'.fringes 
of the formal economy intb starvation ahddestitutioh almost guaranteed 
that the reforms would become untenable. The speed and extent of 
enforced structural change was greater than the fabric of the polity 
Would allow. Kaunda -- faced with cireumStarfces on external accbunt 
where things could hardly deteriorate further -- had little to lose, and 
much domestic popularity to ‘gain, Vy turning his back or# tUe iMf.
The nature of donor interaction with IbtSl ffOVernmehts is- «it 
factor to be monitored during implementation of a reform programme. With 1 
regard to the Zambian auction, donor financial support contracted 
substantially after the July 1986 attempts by the Bank of Zambia to modify the 
auction' This reduced the flow of dollars to the auction and contributed to 
the accelerated depreciation of the kwacha that occurred from July 1986 to 
April 1987 '(Figure 1)- _
Proponents put forth the argument that auctions are preferable to discrete 
devaluations because they remove some of the onus from governments resulting 
from the decision to devalue (Quirket al, 1987). However in the case of 
Zambia, this proved to be a double-edged sword. If the-government blames the 
IMF for forcing the auction upon the nation against its will, the auction 
quickly becomes a scapegoat for all the pain of adjustment (Sanderson, 1987). 
Citizens come to believe that there is no end in sight to economic and social 
upheaval, and that they are being made to suffer while foreign bankers and 
TNC's get rich. This is clearly ndt conducive to the adjustment process ana 
ultimately imperils the survival of the entire reform programme.
2 0
21 To better appreciate these difficulties, see Weidemann et al.(1987) 
for a discussion of the developments in Zambian maize meal consumer pricing 
policy which led to the December 1986 riots in the Copperbelt.
With regard to the''agricultural sector, one elementary hypothesis is that 
devaluation provides fresh incentive for export activities as well as import 
substitution. However, the ability of agriculture to respond to price signals 
is often constrained by lack of infrastructure, low liquidity, and a legacy of 
official neglect. Typically, long-run supply response is greater than short- 
run response, because with time, constraints are to some extent overcome. In' 
general, an agricultural sector with extensive marketing infrastrueture which 
is already well-integrated into the cash economy will respond more quickly to 
price incentives than an agricultural sector which is relatively uftder- 
developed. ...... , ' ■ .V :
The potential long-run effects on Tood self-sufficiency levels are 
ambiguous. While, new incentives for import substitutibh M y  emerge due to 
higher import costs resulting from devalilaltipn^ rdsdurceis may be transferred 
into the production of export crops whose prices also become more attractive . 
a$ a result of devaluation. If there is a net movement away from food crop 
production without a corresponding, fall in consumption, greater dependence on 
■impbrted foodstuffs will occur. This issue cart only-be Clarified through 
cdreful analysis of costs and returns at the farm 1feVel.
Table 14 presents data for important structural characteristics for Zambia 
and three other SADCC countries. The structure of the Zambian economy is 
quite different than that of the othfer countries in several ways; Experts are 
highly* concentrated in the mining sector which accounts for over 90% of total 
1985 exports. For the other three countries, export revenue sources are more 
diversified and agriculture plays a far more prominent ihole. Mafawi and 
Tanzania are especially dependent on agriculture although no single^commodity 
dominates to the degree that copper dominates Zambian exports. Zimbabwe has a 
more diversified, economy than the other SADCC countries with several sectors 
(agriculture, mining, manufacturing) historically important for generation of 
export revenues. One could hypothesize that because the agricultural sectors 
are more developed in these countries, agriculture would be quicker to respond, 
than in Zambia. In addition, export response would be relatively more broad- 
based than in Zambia. -
Prior to the auction, Zambia's agricultural exports were very small 
relative to overall exports (less than 1%) and the agricultural sector 
consumed six times more foreign exchange than it generated (FAO, 1985). This 
meant that short-run adjustment would in all likelihood be painful as it would 
be difficult to generate enough export revenue to pay for imported inputs in 
the short-run. Secondly, from a macro-economic perspective, the chances of 
improved agricultural performance making a significant impact on Zambia's 
balance,of payments problems were doubtful because the sector's export base 
was so small. In, contrast, in each of the other three countries, one could 
hypothesize that adjustment would not be as painful because agricultural 
sector production is not so dependent on imported inputs. The percentage of 
imported inputs as a percentage of agricultural exports is only in the ten 
percent range for each of these countries. In addition, the relative 
prominence of the agricultural sector as a source of export revenue means that 
improved export incentives could have a greater positive short and medium-run 
balance of payments impact than was possible in Zambia.
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TABLE 14: Indicators for Potential Effects of Moving from Foreign Exchange Rationing tb
Auctioning in Four SADCC Countries
Indicator ■ Zambia Zimbabwe Malawi Tanzania.
Concentration of Exports (1985): 
1st Most Important and Percent 
2nd Most Important and Percent 
3rd Most Important and Percent.. 
Cumulative Percentage'
Copper 84.7% 
Zinc .3.5% 
.Cobalt 1.5% 
89.7%
\
Tobacco 23.5% 
Iron 12.0% 
Cotton 9.8% 
■'45.3%
" Tobacco 41.0% 
Tea 20.4% 
• Sugar. 10.5% 
,71-9%
■Coffee.34.5% 
Cotton 17.6% . 
Sisal 5.5%. 
57.6%
Share of Agriculture in Total 
Merchandise Exports (1982-84) 0.9%.' 40.7% 89.4%- 84.5%
Ag..Input"Imports as a Percent 
of Ag. Exports (1982-84) 629.1% 10.8% 12.6% ' 11:6%
Development of Marketing 
infrastructure LOW ” . HIGH HIGH We d i u m/low
Development of CormierciaT 
Farming (Relative to 
Other African Countries) LOW HIGH - HIGH . MEDIUM
Self-Sufficiency for: 
Coarse Grains (2) 
Wheat (2)
86.4% 
19.7% '
100.0%
60.1%
100.0%
4.9%
9318%
36.4%
(1) September 1984 for Zambia.
(2) For a "normal year” which is calculated using trend production and imports as estimated 
by the.FAO.
Sources: For Zambian commodity export shares, Bank of Zambia "Quarterly Financial and 
Statistical Review,” March 1986;
For Zimbabwean commodity export shares, CSO, "Statistical Yearbook 1987";
For Malawian commodity export shares., Government of Malawi, "Economic Report 1987"; 
For Tanzanian commodity export shares, IMF, "International Financial Statis.itcs," 
May 1988;
For agricultural imports.as a percent of GNP, "International Financial Statisitcs," 
May 1988;
For agricultural exports as a percent of merchandise exports, and inputs as a' 
percent of agricultural exports, FAO, "Trade Yearbook 1985";
For self-sufficiency in coarse grains and wheat, FAO, "Food Supply Situation and 
Crop Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa: Special Report,"Apri1 1988.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we identify the most important lessons learned from the 
analysis. Some implications for decision-makers in government and business are 
also discussed. - c . i
For the most part, import priorities determined in the market-place during the 
auction and bv the government under FEMAC have coincided. .: ■'
Contrary.to pre-auction fears and post-auction conventional wisdom, when 
people were relatively more free to import whatever they wanted, large 
quantities of foreign exchange were not '‘squandered" on unproductive luxury 
consumer goods. The share of auctioned foreign exchange allocated to consumer 
goods did not vary significantly from shares allocated under FEMAC. Shares 
going to "productive" items such as spare parts and capital goods also did not 
vary significantly. There is however some evidence that under FEMAC, variable 
cost items (other than spare parts) have received higher priority while 
financial and transport charges have received lower priority.
Sectoral prioritization has not differed markedly either. Under both the 
auction and FEMAC, manufacturing received a far greater share than any other 
sector'while agriculture was third or fourth. Rankings of other sectors did 
not vary greatly between foreign exchange allocation systems.
As for company ownership status,-allocations to 100% foreign-owned firms 
(TNC' s): have‘'fallen substantially under FEMAC while allocations to 100% ; 
private Zambian-owned firms have, risen. Foreign exchange shares allocated to 
100% GRZ-owged parastata.ls and miked firms have riot varied significantly 
between periods. r
For the most part, these developments in the general economy are mirrored 
Within the agricultural sector. One must however bear in mind that the 
auction only existed for nineteen months. Resource shifts (especially between 
sectors) would probably have been more substantial if the auction had lasted 
longer. - ’ - , - .
Both the auction and FEMAC have contributed to a volatile economic environment 
in which planning by government and business has been rendered extremely 
difficult.
It would be.hard to say which system resulted in greater uncertainty. One 
can however conclude that the source and distribution of uncertainty has to 
some extent shifted. Under the auction, if one bid high enough, availability 
of foreign exchange was certain, both in the quantities and at the time 
desired. However due to exchange rate uncertainty* the amount of kwacha that 
one had to pay to obtain hard currency was Very difficult to discern.
Budgeting became an exercise in futility for both business and government. In 
addition, government had little control over what entered and left the " 
economy. Under FEMAC, exchange rate uncertainty has been reduced although the 
possibility of devaluation still looms. Adequate and timely availability of 
foreign exchange has now become problematic. It would be hard to say that the 
ability of businesses to plan has improved under FEMAC. It is easier to
conclude that piann ng difficulties Have been somewhat reduced for government.
For essential items such as agricultural spare parts where timeliness is 
often of greater concern than price, the auction is a superior system. For 
long-term investment items such as capital equipment, FEMAC may be preferable 
as immediate availability is not as important as having a reliable short to 
medium term indication of price and repayment schedules.
For a foreign exchange allocation system to be effective and lasting, both 
government and business must have some latitude to plan. This must somehow 
involve a compromise between total reliance on the free market and rigid state 
planning. At the same time, red tape needs to be minimized and the amount of 
technical analysis required must hot surpass the resource limitations of 
government. Examination of the Malawian system might be useful to Zambian 
policy-makers.
Excessive finance charges and cash flow difficulties resulting from the tvinq- 
up of funds during the application process appear to have' become ma.ior 
problems under FEMAC.
Although it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of these finance charges 
and what constitutes "excessive" charges, it is clear from, interviews that 
importers consider the tying-up of funds to be a major problem. The ever- 
increasing number of unsuccessful FEMAC applications attests to this as more 
and more local currency is being set aside while the hard currency pie fails 
to grow commensurately. 1
Although there is substantial evidence that the agricultural sector responded 
to the auction bv increasing exports, because the sector was starting from 
such a small base, it would have taken at least several years for significant 
positive balance of payments effects to be felt^
Historically, agricultural exports have only been in the range of 1% of 
total Zambian merchandise exports. Among the 5i African countries (South 
Africa excluded), Zambia ranks 43rd (FAO, 1986). Dependence on copper exports 
alone ranges between 80% and 90%. The export diversification challenge facing 
Zambia is. perhaps more daunting than that of any other country in Africa, One 
could reasonably expect that agriculture's short and medium-term balance of 
payments contributions would be greater in many other Sub-Saharan African 
countries if they were to move,to a floating exchange rate. This could be the 
case for nearby SADCC countries such as Malawi-, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania which 
already have a strong agricultural export base.
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